Policy Coordination in an International Payment System by James T. E. Chapman
Working Paper/Document de travail
2008-17
Policy Coordination in an
International Payment System
by James T. E. Chapman
www.bank-banque-canada.caBank of Canada Working Paper 2008-17
May 2008
Policy Coordination in an
International Payment System
by
James T. E. Chapman
Department of Banking Operations
Bank of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9
jchapman@bankofcanada.ca
Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in
economics and ﬁnance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.
ISSN 1701-9397 © 2008 Bank of Canadaii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Stephen D. Williamson, Charles H. Whiteman, Paula Hernández-Verme,
Hiroshi Fujiki, Ben Fung, and Miguel Molico for helpful comments and suggestions. I would
also like to thank seminar participants at the University of Iowa Macro Lunch, 2005 Midwest
Macroeconomics Meetings, the 2005 Canadian Economics Association meeting, The
Economics of Payments II conference, the Bank of Canada, the University of Ottawa, and the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors for comments and discussion. This paper originally
circulated under the title “Policy in International Payment Systems with a Timing Friction.”iii
Abstract
Given the increasing interdependence of both ﬁnancial systems and attendant payment and
settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two
connected payment systems with separate regulators.
In this paper I show that two central banks operating in a non-cooperative way will not have an
incentive to achieve the optimal allocation of goods. I further show that this non-cooperative
outcome will be supported by a zero intraday interest rate and constant ﬁxed exchange rate. This
is in contrast to recent research; which has shown that domestically a zero intraday interest rate
will achieve a social optimum and that the central bank has an incentive to achieve it.
JEL classiﬁcation: E58, E42, F31, F33
Bank classiﬁcation: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Exchange rate regimes
Résumé
Étant donné l’interdépendance croissante des systèmes ﬁnanciers et des systèmes de paiement et
de règlement qu’ils englobent, il est primordial de déterminer quelle est la politique monétaire
optimale lorsque deux systèmes de paiement interconnectés sont assujettis à la surveillance
d’autorités distinctes.
L’auteur montre que, dans un cadre non coopératif, les deux banques centrales n’ont pas intérêt à
répartir les biens de façon optimale. Il montre également qu’une répartition non optimale est
compatible avec un taux d’intérêt intrajournalier nul et un taux de change ﬁxe. Ce résultat est
contraire aux conclusions de travaux récents voulant que le maintien du taux d’intérêt
intrajournalier à zéro garantisse la réalisation d’un équilibre socialement optimal et que la banque
centrale soit incitée à atteindre cet équilibre.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E58, E42, F31, F33
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Régimes de taux de change; Systèmes de paiement, de compensation
et de règlement1 Introduction
In this paper, I characterize the optimal policy in a two settlement-system
world and then determine whether this policy can be implemented by two cen-
tral banks acting non-cooperatively. Recent work by Hern´ andez-Verme (2005),
Fujiki (2003), and Fujiki (2006) has extended the payment literature to investi-
gate the eﬀects that payment frictions have in an international setting between
two countries under the gold standard. This research bypasses the question
of whether the socially optimal policy between two countries is achievable in a
non-cooperative setting, focusing instead on issues related to the gold standard.
The increasing integration of ﬁnancial markets makes optimal policy among
diﬀerent large value settlement systems particularly relevant today due to in-
terdependencies between systems. Major ﬁnancial institutions are scattered
around the globe in several diﬀerent time zones. In addition, trading activ-
ity, as well as the settlement of trades, may not be uniform during the time a
market is open. Because of this geographic dispersion, the services of a given
settlement system (e.g., Fedwire) might only be available at certain times of
the day. Figure 1 (adapted from Melvin (1995, p.10–11)) illustrates the large
variation in the trading hours of major ﬁnancial centers. The foreign exchange
(FX) market is dispersed among these many countries. In addition, the hours of
operation for these diﬀerent countries vary tremendously: some countries might
be settling transactions (e.g., England) when it is still early in the trading day
in other countries (e.g., United States).
Unlike previous literature dealing with international payments, I focus specif-
ically on optimal policy between two countries which are identical in every re-
spect except that they are located in diﬀerent time zones. This diﬀerence in
trading days between countries allows foreign exchange policy to be indepen-
dent from liquidity provision in the central market.
What eﬀect does this dispersion of trading hours have on intraday foreign
exchange rates and intraday interest rates? Is it optimal for a central bank to
set the intraday interest rate equal to zero? Previous research, such as Mar-
tin (2004), has suggested that a zero interest-rate is optimal policy in a single
payment system. Should a central bank set it to smooth the “lumpiness” in
trading activity? More importantly, can two central banks, working indepen-
dently, achieve an eﬃcient allocation?
To answer these questions, I construct a model—developed in sections 2
through 5 —in which agents in two countries are unable to coordinate domestic
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Figure 1: Trading hours (GMT) for diﬀerent major currency exchanges.
times. The model I construct is based on Freeman (1996) and is similar to
Fujiki (2003) and Fujiki (2006). In section 6, I investigate the equilibrium of
these economies without intervention, while in section 7, I deﬁne the optimal
consumption sequence as that which would have been chosen by a benevolent
social planner. I then go on to analyze optimal monetary policy under a single
authority (section 8) and under two authorities (section 8.1).
I ﬁnd that while the optimal allocation is obtainable by the regime with
two central banks, the two central banks do not have an incentive to achieve
the social optimum. This is in contrast to the results of Fujiki (2003). While
Fujiki (2003) ﬁnds that a ﬁxed exchange rate and active intervention increases
welfare I ﬁnd that the policies implemented by the two central banks do not
attain the social planner’s allocation when they behave non-cooperatively.
In addition, the Nash equilibrium policy that the two central banks imple-
ment in a stationary equilibrium involves setting the intraday interest rate in
the domestic settlement markets equal to zero; this is in contrast to Martin
(2004) who ﬁnds that a zero intraday interest rate is a suﬃcient condition to
achieve the optimal allocation.
The main market imperfection that causes these imperfections is the in-
terdependence between the two markets. In a non-cooperative game a central
bank’s choices include the amount of intervention in each market as well as
2the money supply. Changes in the money supply have the eﬀect of increas-
ing the amount of nominal loans given in equilibrium. This in turn increases
the demand for money by the debtors. The cross-country eﬀect then causes
an increase in the supply of loans in the other country which feedback to the
home country. This feedback channel is not taken into account by the domestic
central bank when it maximizes the welfare of the domestic agents.
2 Environment
I develop a model, similar to Fujiki (2003), in which two economies are repre-
sented by island chains. These economies are identical in all endowments and
internal movements of agents. Each chain consists of a large number of island
pairs surrounding a central island. Each island pair consists of one island pop-
ulated by two-period-lived agents, called debtors, and another island populated
by two-period lived agents, called creditors. Each type of agent is endowed with
an island-speciﬁc good when young.
International trade exists between the two economies, resulting in an associ-
ated foreign exchange market. The agents of one country, A, tend to participate
in the early part of the foreign exchange market. The participants of the other
country, B, tend to participate later in the foreign exchange market. Country
A may be thought of as being in an earlier time zone than country B.
Debtors born in period t are endowed with one unit of an island-speciﬁc
good ¯ DA
t or ¯ DB
t , when young—the superscript denotes the origin of the good,
A or B. Debtors primarily wish to consume when young; when young they wish
to consume both their own good as well as the good produced by a creditor
island in their island chain. The precise timing of this shock will be made clear











dt denotes the amount of creditor good consumed by young domestic
debtors in period t and DA
dt denotes the amount of debtor good consumed by
young domestic debtors in period t. This notation follows the pattern used in
the remainder of the paper: subscripts will denote the type of agent associated
with a quantity, creditors or debtors, as well as the time period of the transac-
tion. Superscripts will denote ﬁrst the country of origin of the quantity, country
A or country B, and, if needed for clarity, the nationality of the agent involved.
3Debtors are assumed to be risk averse, the utility function (1) is assumed to
satisfy the usual von Neumann–Morgenstern properties, both types of goods
are assumed to be normal goods, and the cross partial derivative is assumed to
be monotonic.
Creditors born in period t are endowed with one unit of an island-speciﬁc
good, denoted ¯ CA
t . In addition, the initial old creditors in period 0 are endowed
with a stock of money mA
0 . Creditors wish to consume goods in both periods
of life. In the ﬁrst period, they wish to consume creditor goods of their own
island chain. In the second period, they wish to consume debtor goods. During
the second period—the precise timing of which will be made clear in the next
section—creditors receive a taste shock. With probability ψ, they wish to
consume foreign goods, and with probability (1 − ψ), they wish to consume
domestic goods. The taste shock is independently and identically distributed































ct denotes creditor consumption of their own good in period t when
young, D
A,A
ct+1 denotes consumption of the country A debtor good by country A
creditors in period (t+1) when old and D
B,A
ct+1 denotes consumption of country
B good by country A creditors in period (t + 1) when old.
Both types of agents are allowed to write unfalsiﬁable one-period debt con-
tracts that will be settled at the beginning of the next period on the central
island of their island chain. It is assumed that these contracts may only be
written and settled in the money of the home-island chain.1 Agents are not al-
lowed to default on written debt contracts. This implies that, at the beginning
of the next period, all agents must travel to the central island to settle their
debt.
In addition to the two types of agents, each island chain is assumed to have
a monetary authority that is based on the central island. This authority can
costlessly produce domestic currency in any period and enforce the execution
of contracts on the central island. Each monetary authority also prefers to
maximize the utility of agents native to its island chain. The objectives of the
monetary authorities will be discussed further in section 8.
1This seemingly-innocuous assumption makes the demand for the two currencies well-
deﬁned and avoids the indeterminacy result of Kareken and Wallace (1981).
4Overview of Travel and Trade When Young Young debtors will travel
to the creditor island to purchase creditor good for consumption. Since they do
not have money and there is no double coincidence of wants, the young debtors
will write cheques to ﬁnance their purchase; these cheques will be cleared on
the central island at the beginning of the next period. On returning to their
island, the old creditors will arrive wishing to purchase debtor goods. At this
point, the young debtors have a demand for money to settle the debt they have
written, so old creditors will purchase debtor goods using money.
Overview of Travel and Trade When Old At the beginning of the period,
all old creditors travel to the central island to receive the money they need to
purchase debtor goods. Only a fraction of the debtors arrive at the beginning
of the period and settle their debt. Some creditors receive a preference shock
and wish to leave before the remaining debtors arrive. The leaving creditors
trade the unsettled debt with the creditors who are staying in return for money.
After these early-leaving creditors have departed, the remaining debtors arrive
and settle their debt.
Once the creditors leave the central island, they receive a taste shock. If the
creditors wish to consume foreign goods, then they must travel to the foreign
exchange market prior to traveling to the other island. Since the countries have
diﬀerent trading days, some early-leaving creditors trade in the FX market with
late-leaving creditors from the other country.
3 Debtor Travel and Trade
I shall focus on the travel and trade of the country A debtors, since the prob-
lems of debtors of each of the countries are symmetric with the exception of
superscripts.
In the ﬁrst part of period t, the young debtors travel to the creditor island
to purchase creditor goods. Since they have no money and there is no double
coincidence of wants, young debtors write debt contracts to the creditors for a
nominal amount hA
t . They then use this debt to buy creditor goods equal to
P A
c,tCA
dt. Finally, they return to their home island.
In the second part of period t, old creditors, (both domestic and foreign),





t respectively with them to the debtor island. They
use this money to purchase debtor goods, D
A,A
ct in the domestic late-leaver case,
5CentralI sland
OldC reditors









Figure 2: Trade pattern for young debtors and creditors.
at the price P A
d,t.
This pattern of trade can be seen in ﬁgure 2 where, for simplicity, old foreign







In period (t + 1), debtors travel to the central island to settle their debt
contracts. They arrive at the central island at two possible times. A debtor
arrives at the start of the settlement period with probability λ.
3.1 Maximization Problem of Debtors















The left-hand side of equation (3) is the total nominal value of the debtor’s
endowment, while the right-hand side is the total nominal value of the debtor’s
consumption bundle.




dt must equal the amount of loans that the debtors demand, hA
t . In addi-
tion, old creditors arriving at the end of period t trade money for debtor goods












Young debtors demand money in order to settle the debts they have incurred
with creditors. Therefore, they demand enough money to pay their debts, mA
t
equals hA
t . Substituting equation (3) into equation (1) and using the market-
clearing condition for money and debt, yields the maximization problem for



































































4 Creditor Travel and Trade
Again, I shall focus on the economic problem of country A creditors. In this
case, the problems of A and B creditors are not quite identical because of the
friction in the foreign exchange market. Unless noted otherwise, the internal
travel and trade is identical for creditors of both nationalities.
In period t, young creditors choose how much of their own good to consume
and how much to trade when young debtors arrive at their island. They sell
CA
dt creditor goods to the young debtors at a price of P A
c,t and supply ℓA
t in loans
to debtors to ﬁnance this purchase.
In period (t + 1), creditors leave for the central island to settle the debt
they received in t. All creditors arrive at the beginning of the period, but there
is uncertainty concerning when they will wish to leave the central island. A
fraction α of creditors suﬀer a taste shock and wish to leave early before all
debtors have arrived, while the remaining (1 − α) creditors wait until the end
of the settlement period. Creditors do not know ex ante whether they will wish
7to leave the settlement period early and as such are not able to write a contract
to overcome this uncertainty.
Once the taste shock has been realized the early- and late-leaving creditors
may trade unsettled debt for money. Late-leaving creditors will wish to pur-
chase an amount qA
t+1 of the early-leavers’ unsettled debt at a discount ρA
t+1 of
its settled value. Early-leaving creditors wish to sell the entire amount of un-
cleared debt since it will not be accepted by any agents that the creditors inter-
act with later in the period. Therefore, early-leaving creditors oﬀer (1−λ)αℓA
t




t = (1 − α)q
A
t+1 (5)
which equates the early-leavers unsettled debt to late-leavers debt repurchases.
As mentioned, the resale debt is bought at a discount ρA
t+1 of its face value.
Since the early-leavers will inelastically sell all of their unsettled debt, the
discount rate is determined by the amount of funds available on the part of
the late-leavers. The amount of money they have to oﬀer equals the amount
that has been settled by early-arriving debtors. Therefore, the total amount
of money exchanged for the debt, ρA
t+1qA
t+1 must be less then this amount λℓA
t .








When constraint (6) binds, the market equilibrium will not be socially optimal.
In this case, monetary policy is welfare improving, as will be shown below.
When they depart, early-leavers have the sum of what they already had
received from debtors and the amount they were able to secure in the debt








Once the early-leavers have departed, the remaining debtors arrive at the cen-
tral island.
At the end of the settlement period, the late-leaving creditors receive the
remaining (1 − λ)ℓA
t in debt that they extended to debtors. In addition, they
receive the debt that they purchased from the early leavers. Since they pur-
chased this debt at a discount, on net they receive the surplus of this debt or
8(1 − ρA
t+1)qA









where the ﬁrst term of this amount is the surplus the late-leavers collect from
the early leavers and the second term is the amount of their own debt that has
been cleared.
Once creditors leave the island they are subject to a taste shock. With
probability ψ they wish to consume foreign debtor goods and with probability
(1 − ψ) they wish to consume domestic debtor goods.
The assumption that debtors must settle their debts in the domestic cur-
rency of their island chain implies that they will only accept that currency. This
means that creditors with a taste for foreign goods must buy foreign exchange.
These creditors are able to buy the foreign currency in the foreign exchange
market—the mechanics of which is explained in detail in section 5—and then
go on to buy D
B,A
ct+1 amount of the debtor good from the foreign debtors at price
P B
d,t+1.
Creditors with a taste for domestic goods go directly to the domestic debtor’s
islands and buy amount D
A,A
ct+1 of the domestic good at price P A
d,t+1. Once the
transactions have been made creditors then consume the debtor goods they
bought. The total travel patterns as discussed in this section and section 3
are depicted in ﬁgure 3. In the ﬁrst stage of travel all creditors and λ debtors
arrive. Then α creditors leave early with ψ traveling to the foreign debtor is-
lands and the remainder travel to the domestic debtor islands. The remaining
(1 − λ) debtors arrive and settle their debt. The remaining (1 − α) creditors
then leave for debtor islands with ψ traveling to the foreign debtor island and
the remainder traveling to the domestic debtor island.
4.1 Creditors Maximization Problem
Country A creditors seek to maximize (2) subject to the timing frictions set
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Figure 3: Travel pattern for old creditors and debtors.
subject to the following budge constraints, one each equating the amount of


























































































Here, the tildes represent amounts purchased if the creditor must leave the
settlement island early, hats denote amounts bought by a creditor who is in
the other foreign exchange market—the early foreign exchange market if a late-
leaver and vice versa for an early-leaver—and lower-case letters denote amounts
10eﬀected by an aggregate default.
The terms in equation (11) involving the foreign exchange market are slightly








































































































































To avoid increasing the complexity of the notation even further, I deﬁne—















t+1(1 − λ) + λ, (17)
as “return” for earlier-leaving creditors. Therefore, the nominal amount of
money that an early-leaving creditor has when leaving the central island for
their ﬁnal destination is, for a country A creditor, τ(ρA
t+1)ℓA
t and a late-leaving
country A creditor has the nominal amount κ(ρA
t+1)ℓA
t .
Two points should be noted about the multipliers. First, if there is a liq-
11uidity shortage, so ρt+1 < 1, then 0 < τ(ρt+1) < 1 with κ(ρt+1) > 1. Second, if
there is no liquidity shortage then both τt+1(ρt+1) and κ(ρt+1) equal one. The
ﬁrst property shows how a liquidity shortage shifts wealth from early- to late-
leavers, while the second shows that the wealth is equal only when no shortage
exists.
Using the optimization problem (11) and the multipliers (16) and (17) the,






























































































































































































































































































































































These characterize the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the creditors’ op-
timization problems. At the optimum, the terms in brackets individually equal
zero, At the optimum, each bracketed term equates a marginal rate of substitu-
tion to a price ratio subject to a “wedge” introduced by the settlement friction.2
Without a settlement friction, τ(ρA
t+1) and κ(ρA
t+1) equal one, so equations (18)
and (19) are then solved by equating marginal rates of substitution to price
ratios as in the socially optimal case.
5 Foreign Exchange Market
The domestic creditors who emigrate to the foreign island meet the foreign
creditors who immigrate and exchange domestic currency for foreign currency
in a foreign exchange market. In a manner similar to Fujiki (2003), the foreign
exchange market operates in two waves, which may be thought of as country
B’s morning and country B’s afternoon.
As previously mentioned, the two economies are identical in all respects
except for their time zone. This diﬀerence in time zone implies that the two
economies have diﬀerent trading hours and some agents who leave the central
2These may be also thought of as equating the stochastic discount factor and return in
the diﬀerent states of the world to the price of consumption in that state of the world in
terms of present consumption.
13island early in one economy interact in the foreign exchange market with late-
leavers from the other economy’s central island.
This diﬀerence in time zone is represented by the parameter β, which varies
from zero to one. The larger the value of β the more “out of sync” are the two
economies in terms of their trading day. When β equals zero, both countries
have the same trading hours and early creditors only meet with other early
creditors. When β equals one, neither country is willing to trade when the
other country is open for trade.
Because of this diﬀerence, (1−β) early B creditors meet β late A creditors,
as well as the early A creditors, to trade currencies. In the afternoon, the
diﬀerence in time zones causes β of the early B creditors and all the late
domestic creditors to meet with only (1 − β) late country A creditors to trade
currencies.
Creditors on both sides exchange their domestic money for foreign money
at a market-determined exchange rate. In the early foreign exchange market,
















Similarly, the exchange rate for the late foreign exchange market, denoted et+1,















From these equations it is obvious that the exchange rate will depend on the
relative amounts of loans supplied in the two domestic markets.
6 Equilibrium
Here, I shall deﬁne an equilibrium where, for all periods, all three types of
markets—good markets, money markets and debt markets—clear, the ﬁrst-
order conditions of all four types of agents are satisﬁed and where the amount
of goods consumed is equal to the endowments. This is formalized in the
following deﬁnition:








ct , ˜ D
A,B











14country B quantity sequences
{D
B,B




ct , ˜ D
B,A
















































1. Agents are maximizing utility, so equation (18) and equation (19) are
satisﬁed for all t and equation (3.1) is satisﬁed for country A debtors and
country B debtors for all t.





dt + (1 − ψ)(1 − α)D
A,A
ct + (1 − ψ)α ˜ D
A,A












dt + (1 − ψ)(1 − α)D
B,B
ct + (1 − ψ)α ˜ D
B,B
ct + ψ(1 − β)(1 − α)D
B,A
ct
+ψβ(1 − α) ˆ D
B,A







































and the secondary debt markets,
q
A





t+1 = α(1 − λ)ℓ
B
t ,
as well as the foreign exchange markets, equations (20) and (21).
To simplify analysis, I shall assume endowments are constant and equal in
the two economies for all time periods. Therefore, it is natural to deﬁne a
time-invariant market equilibrium. Thus, I deﬁne a stationary equilibrium as
an equilibrium in which all variables do not depend on the time index.
In addition, to examine the key frictions in the model, I shall also assume
the liquidity constraint (6) binds, α exceeds λ, and that β does not equal zero.
In the case of the liquidity constraint holding, it follows from equations (5) and







Substituting equation (22) into the ﬁrst-order condition (11) implies that the
late-leaving creditors who travel internal to their economy have a higher con-
sumption than early-leavers. This obtains because, in a liquidity-constrained
equilibrium, debt resells at a discount, so ρA
t+1 is less then one.
Assuming, for the moment, that the money supply is constant and equal
to m in both countries A and B and the liquidity constraint (6) binds implies
some characteristics of a stationary equilibrium.













t = ρ (24)
16without intervention on the part of the monetary authorities.
Second, as mentioned previously, the liquidity constraint implies that ρ
is less then one. This in turn implies that τ(ρ) < 1 < κ(ρ): early-leavers
have a smaller share of money when they leave the central island. The per
capita amount of money that early-leavers have is ℓB
t /α or λℓA
t /α depending on







again depending on nationality.
Third, when β does not equal zero, the exchange rate appreciates over the




[βατ(ρ) + (1 − α)κ(ρ)]ℓB
(1 − β)(1 − α)κ(ρ)ℓA
[β(1 − α)κ(ρ) + ατ(ρ)]ℓA
(1 − β)ατ(ρ)ℓB
=
(βλ + (1 − λ))(β(1 − λ) + λ)
(1 − β)2λ(1 − λ)
> 1. (25)
From the second and third points, it follows that agents from country B
who participate in the FX market have three possible levels of A-money when
they arrive at the country A debtor islands. Either they are early-leavers who
participated in the early FX market, early-leavers who participate in the late
FX market—that is β-leavers—or late-leavers who participate in the late FX







This occurs because ˜ e is less than e by the liquidity constraint and the time-








Therefore, the β-leavers have the least amount of foreign exchange when they
reach the country A debtor islands. At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that the
relative wealth of the early-leavers in the early FX market and the late-leavers






where the ﬁrst term is weakly greater than one and the second term is weakly
less than one; therefore their product may greater or less then one. But, without
intervention, these two terms are both determined by the liquidity constraint,
17and the product of the two is equal to, after simpliﬁcation, is
α[β(1 − λ) + λ][1 + (1 − β)λ]
(1 − α)(1 − β)2λ2
which is strictly greater than one. In the case of country A agents, the β-leavers
are late-leavers, so equations (26) and (27) may be rewritten as
κ(ρ)e > τ(ρ)˜ e
and
κ(ρ)e > κ(ρ)˜ e.






which is strictly greater than one since both terms in the product are greater
then one.
7 Social Planner’s Problem
The solution to the social planner’s problem provides a benchmark against
which to judge candidate equilibria. The social planner is assumed to have as
an objective function the weighted average utilities of the four diﬀerent agents
in the economies. Therefore, the planner maximizes





























































































































d + (1 − ψ)α ˜ D
A,A
c + (1 − ψ)(1 − α)D
A,A
c
+ ψα(1 − β) ˜ D
A,B
c + ψβα ˆ D
A,B







d + (1 − ψ)α ˜ D
B,B
c + (1 − ψ)(1 − α)D
B,B
c (33)
+ ψα ˜ D
B,A
c + ψβ(1 − α) ˆ D
B,A
c + ψ(1 − β)(1 − α)D
B,A
c (34)
Here, the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints are given in parentheses on
the left.
The above constrained optimization problem yields the following results.
First, the marginal rate of substitution between debtors and creditors who





































Second, the marginal rate of substitution for creditors, who consume foreign









































Third, the weighted marginal utility of same-origin debtor goods is equalized








































If the cross-derivative of creditors utility, U12 (·,·), is zero, then it follows
that when  B exceeds  A, DA,A
c is less than DA,B
c and DB,A
c is less than DB,B
c
which in turn implies that DA
d is less than DB
d . Finally, if the endowments are
19constant, then the social planner’s allocation should also be constant through
time.
The optimal solution to the social planner’s problem essentially involves
relaxing to relax both types of timing frictions, both inter- and intra-country.
In addition, the goods are then apportioned according to the social planner’s
weights.
When  B equals  A, regardless of the cross-derivative’s sign, it follows that
the social planner collapses the problem into a classical general-equilibrium
problem with two types, creditors and debtors, ignoring nationality.
8 Monetary Policy
First, assume just one Monetary Authority (MA) for both economies. This MA
is assumed to have the same welfare function as the social planner (29).
The MA is assumed to be able to print both country A and country B
money costlessly. It can also intervene in both discount-loan markets as well
as both periods of the foreign exchange market.
I shall focus on stationary equilibria and policies. This rules out policies
where there is non-zero money growth between periods and where the MA holds
stocks of either type of money.
Since the MA has the same objective function as the social planner, it is
natural to see whether a single MA can achieve the social planner’s alloca-
tion. As shown in section 7, the social planner’s allocation is deﬁned as an
allocation where the marginal rates of substitution for the two types of agents
are equalized within a country and the marginal utilities of the three possi-
ble outcomes from traveling to the other country are equalized, which implies
that the three outcomes are equalized. Therefore, if the MA can achieve the
same equalizations, then it follows that he will have maximized his objective
function.3
From equation (3.1), the ﬁrst order condition of a debtor, and the ﬁrst order
conditions for creditors, equations (18) and (19), it follows that, at the optimum
τ(ρt) = κ(ρt) = 1
for both countries and for all t.
3It is true that this characterization does not completely capture the social planner’s
solution. The social planner’s solution could, in fact, be attained by allowing initially non-
stationary policies which converge to in ﬁnite time to a stationary equilibrium.
20Relaxing the liquidity constraint can be achieved in a stationary equilibrium
by having an elastic money supply in each settlement market as described in
Freeman (1996). The MA implements this by purchasing the fraction (α − λ)
of debt in both settlement markets. This relaxes the liquidity constraints (15)
and (13), and the discount rates of debt rise to equal one. In the late part of
the settlement market, the remaining debtors arrive and settle their debt; at
this point the MA retires the money it receives from the discounted debt it
purchases.
When the MA provides an elastic money supply in both domestic markets,
it then follows that the early foreign exchange rate is
˜ e =
(1 − β)αℓB
[(1 − β)α + β]ℓA (39)
and the late foreign exchange rate is
e =
[(1 − α) + βλ]ℓB
[(1 − α) + βα − β]ℓA. (40)
To implement a stationary equilibrium, which achieves the social planner’s
allocation, these two exchange rates must be equated. The single MA may
equalize these exchange rates by printing country B currency and selling it in
the early exchange market where it is relatively more valuable. The MA then
sells the country B money it has acquired in the late FX market when it is
relatively more valuable. In the early foreign exchange market, the MA issues
(βℓA/ℓB) country B money and uses this to buy A money. This additional
liquidity causes the early foreign exchange rate to rise to (ℓB/ℓA). Once this
transaction is over, the MA is left holding β of A money. Using this, the MA
intervenes on the A side of the late foreign exchange rate which causes the
exchange rate to fall to (ℓA/ℓB).
This intervention has the result that (e/˜ e) equals one, leaving the MA with
no reserves between periods and hence not changing the money supplies or the
price levels,so the policy is a stationary one. Since all timing frictions—both
internal to the two countries as well as between the two countries—have been
relaxed, it follows that the allocation associated with this policy is the social
planner’s allocation.
218.1 Two Monetary Authorities
A natural next question is whether this policy is implementable in a stationary
way by two MA authorities acting in a coordinated manner. The internal fric-
tions can both be dealt with by the respective monetary authorities using their
own currencies. Due to the timing structure of the model, only the country B
MA is able to implement a stationary equilibrium with no intra-day apprecia-
tion since B money must be created in the early foreign exchange market.
Therefore, in the cooperative case, the policies of the two MAs is as follows:
country A’s policy is to set ρA
t equal to one for all t and conduct no intervention
in the foreign exchange markets; country B’s policy is to set ρB
t equal to one
for all t, sell (βℓA/ℓB) of B money in the early foreign exchange market and
sell the A money it receives, as a result of the intervention in the early market,
in the late foreign exchange market.
9 Policy Interdependence
Now assume that each island has an independent monetary authority that
wishes to maximize the welfare of the inhabitants of its island chain. Each MA
seeks to maximize the utility of their own debtor and creditor population given
the policy choices of the MA of the other country. Therefore, the country A
MA has a welfare function of the form





















































where   is the weight that the monetary authority places on the welfare of the
debtors. Country B’s MA has a welfare function which is similar in form,





















































the natural diﬀerence being that the utility functions of the B creditor and
debtor enter the welfare function of the country B MA instead of the A creditor
and debtors.
22Each monetary authority can costlessly print a unique unfalsiﬁable type of
money. Each MA is able to transact in their own discount loan market and in
both periods of the foreign exchange market. In addition, each MA can hold
foreign reserves of the other’s currency between periods.
The policies employed by the two MAs form a non-cooperative game. In
the remainder of the paper I will examine Nash equilibria deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Nash Policy Equilibrium). I deﬁne a Nash Policy Equilibrium


















t are country A and country B’s MAs’ interventions in the
FX market such that an MA’s choice of policy sequences under their control
maximize either their domestic welfare function, either (41) or (42), subject to
the chosen policy sequence of the other MA.
A stationary Nash policy equilibrium is then a Nash policy equilibrium
which is also a stationary equilibrium and where all policy variables are time
invariant. The deﬁnition of stationarity implies that money growth must be
zero for all t.
I shall further assume that there is a commitment technology which allows
both MA to commit at time 0 to play a constant policy every period.4 There-
fore, in a stationary equilibrium, each MA plays as a strategy a tuple consisting
of a within period of intervention in the FX market (υA or υA), and a discount
rate (ρA, and ρB).
Showing that a two-monetary-authority system cannot maintain the social
planner’s allocation proceeds from the fact that there is a constant amount of
the four goods to divide between the four types of agents. The consumption of
creditor goods is purely a domestic matter while a country’s domestic debtor
goods are consumed by three of the four agents. In a stationary equilibrium,
the monetary value, and real value due to stationarity, of foreign debtor goods
that a foreign consuming creditor receives is a constant fraction of the foreign
creditor’s supply of loans. The domestic MA takes this foreign loan amount
as given and therefore does not internalize the eﬀect that its own agent’s loan
choice has on the other country’s agents.
4the presence of an underlying market equilibrium makes it unclear whether the folk
theorem can even be applied in a stationary Nash policy equilibrium.
23The proof of this will proceed as follows. First, I shall present the solution
to the problem where each MA chooses how to allocate the goods between do-
mestic agents taking the amount of foreign goods available for redistribution
as given. This optimization problem is subject to two sets of constraints: the
ﬁrst set limits the allocations an MA can choose from to those which are im-
plementable by the loan market, the second set maps the amount that an MA
chooses to allocate to domestic creditors to the amount of domestic good avail-
able to the foreign MA for allocation among foreign creditors. Second, given
an MA’s choice of domestic quantities and the policy variable choices of the
foreign MA, I shall show that there is a market equilibrium which implements
this allocation and a determinant set of domestic policy variables. Third, I shall
then show that there is a joint indeterminacy of the policy variables which lead
to the same quantity allocations.
First, consider the “partial” planner’s problem for each country. The partial
planner allocates domestic goods between domestic agents prior to the ψ shock
being realized. The domestic goods allocated to foreign consuming creditors are
then turned over to the other partial planner. The resulting foreign goods can
then be distributed between domestic creditors who wish to consume foreign.
These restrictions are necessary to ensure that the possible market allo-
cations are a subset of the given partial planner’s problem. In a stationary
market equilibrium goods map one-to-one with the amount of money an agent
has. The above restrictions on the partial planner mimic the timing of the
foreign consumption shock. This restriction is without loss of generality for
my purposes since all the possible market equilibria are in the choice set of the
partial planner as well as non-market equilibria.
The optimization problem of the country A MA given these constraints,
the resource constraints of the social planner, equations (30) to (33), and the
welfare functions (41) and (42) is
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The last terms in equation (46) are the amount of A goods that are transferred
to the other partial planner for redistribution amongst its agents. Similarly the
left hand side of constraint (47) represents the amount of B debtor good that
is transferred to the A partial planner’s control for redistribution.
Similarly the optimization problem for the B partial planner is
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The game that the two MAs play therefore involves the allocation of quan-
tities to domestic agents. The interdependence comes from the change this
has on the constraints of the other partial planner. The existence of a Nash
equilibrium follows from the fact that the quantities available to both MAs are
ﬁnite and that the best response functions are continuous. The continuity of
the best response functions follows from the fact that the value functions for
the two above problems are continuous due to the continuity of the objective
function and the compactness of the space of possible allocations.
Given the existence of a Nash equilibrium, the following results derive from
25the ﬁrst-order conditions of the two optimization problems above. First, in a
solution to the partial planner’s problem the internal liquidity shortage is eased
by the domestic monetary authority. This is independent of the foreign partial
planner’s problem. Second, the solution to the partial planner’s problem sets
the marginal rate of substitution of the domestic consuming creditor with that
of the domestic debtors. Third, the domestic MA will attempt to equalize the
marginal utility of the three foreign consuming creditors, subject to the amount
of foreign debtor goods made available in the foreign exchange market; the MA
will not introduce more inequality of consumption.
In a Nash equilibrium the only thing that matters in a partial planner’s so-
lution is the amount of debtor good apportioned to the creditors. This amount
relaxes the other partial planner’s constraint of the other countries debtor goods
that it can allocate to its consumers who have a ψ taste shock. In addition,
it tightens the constraint on the amount of domestic goods allocated to do-
mestic consuming creditors. Suppose a partial planner could allocate diﬀerent
quantities of domestic goods .
Using these facts and equating the marginal values of relaxing and tighten-








































As can be seen by comparing equations (50) and (51) to (37) and (38)—
of which the latter two are the necessary conditions for a social planner’s
optimum—an equilibrium in the Nash policy sense, where equations (50) and
(51) must hold, must be diﬀerent from a social planner’s optimum where equa-
tion (37) and (38) must hold.
From the above problems of the partial planners, one can see that an MAs
policy is to set ρA and ρB equal to one, and as above in the single MA case
country B’s MA intervenes in the early FX market by the amount (βℓB/ℓA)
and reverses it in the later FX market.
The intuition behind the diﬀerent allocations that arise from the social plan-
ner’s allocation and the Nash policy allocation are similar to the intuition in
Tapking and Yang (2006). One can think of both MAs as producers of settle-
ment liquidity which the agents in the economy use to relax the coordination
problem in the settlement market. For as Freeman (1996) pointed out, this
26increases the amount of loans in equilibrium and allows more trade of goods.
Since ex ante a creditor does not know whether they will consume domesti-
cally or abroad it follows that, all other things being equal, an increase in the
amount of loans in the foreign market will increase the return on accepting a
check from a domestic debtor and therefore increase the domestic amount of
checks in circulation. In the noncooporative case, an MA does not internalize
this secondary eﬀect an increase in domestic check writing (or alternatively an
increase in the amount of debtor goods available to the creditors) has through
increasing foreign check writing. Therefore, the settlement liquidity provided
by the two MAs are complement goods and this complementarity is not fully
taken into account by either MA.
The solution to a partial planner’s problem is equivalent to a market equilib-
rium. This can be seen from the fact that the in a partial planner’s equilibrium
the domestic consuming creditor’s and debtor’s marginal rates of substitution
are equated to each other, which is a necessary condition for the market equilib-
rium since that debtor’s marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio in
a market equilibrium. The resource constraints imply that the market clearing
conditions for goods are satisﬁed. The constraints on the possible allocations
of goods above replicate the constraints implied by the workings of the loan
markets.
There is, however, an indeterminacy in the above policy: in a stationary,
solution the money supply for both countries is constant between period. Each
MA sets the intraday interest rate equal to one by using an elastic money supply
in the settlement market. It expands the money supply by buying unsettled
early debt and then decreases the money supply back to normal when he debt
clears. The indeterminacy arises in the foreign exchange market. If country B
increases the B money supply by more than the optimal amount above, then
the MA of country A can increase its money supply by a compensating amount
and uses the additional money to buy intervene in the foreign exchange markets.
This will result in the same foreign exchange rates as above and, therefore, the
same quantities will be allocated in the same manner. This indeterminacy is
related to the indeterminacy of the foreign exchange rate found by Kareken and
Wallace (1981). In this case, the exchange rate is determinant, but the policy
used to achieve the exchange rate is partially indeterminate in terms of money
supply levels.5
5This does hold in a non-stationary equilibrium. There may exist equilibrium where
changes in the money supply have real eﬀects even though the relative supplies might be
ﬁxed. I thank Paula Hern´ andez-Verme for this comment.
2710 Conclusion
When agents use debt to facilitate trade, and there is uncertainty concerning
the settlement of this debt, a central bank should provide liquidity to alleviate
this uncertainty. In this paper, I have looked at the interaction between two
central banks and whether they can reach the social optimum by a coordinated
policy.
The model I constructed is an extension of Freeman (1996), the principle
diﬀerence being that in my model, there exist two payment systems which
have diﬀerent times of operation. In addition, there is a separate authority in
charge of each settlement system, each of which cares only for the participants
belonging to its payment system.
In the non-cooperative case, I show that as a one-shot case the MA cannot
implement the single MA case as an equilibrium. The non-cooperative result
stems from the lack of choice in how creditors behave after extending the loans.
While, in principle, this lack of choice is defensible as an extension of the current
literature in payment systems—and has been argued to be one of the essential
ingredients by Zhou (2000)—the strength of the results rests on these strong
assumptions. Therefore, the natural next step in this line of research is to
enrich the set of choices that creditors have to see what aﬀect this has on the
non-cooperative result.
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